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Abstract
Using data on physician behavior from the 1979 – 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys (NHDS), I
estimate the relationship between malpractice pressure, as identified by the adoption of non‐economic
damage caps and related tort reforms, and certain decisions faced by obstetricians during the delivery of
a child. The NHDS data, supplemented with restricted geographic identifiers, provides inpatient
discharge records from a broad enough span of states and covering a long enough period of time to
allow for a defensive medicine analysis that draws on an extensive set of variations in relevant tort laws.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find no evidence to support the claim that malpractice pressure
induces physicians to perform a substantially greater number of cesarean sections. Extending this
analysis to certain additional measures, however, I do find some evidence consistent with positive
defensive behavior among obstetricians. For instance, I estimate that the adoption of a non‐economic
damage cap is associated with a reduction in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries,
without a corresponding change in observed neonatal outcomes.
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Introduction
A number of empirical studies to date have attempted to explore the relationship between

physician behavior and measures of malpractice pressure. Of course, the existence of any such
relationship need not signify a problem with the malpractice system itself. It may simply indicate that
malpractice liability is working in the intended manner – that is, by deterring physicians from acting in
an otherwise undesirable manner. The intent of these empirical investigations, on the other hand, is
generally to identify situations in which an imperfectly‐designed system of malpractice liability causes
physicians to produce a sub‐ or supra‐optimal level of care, often referred to as “defensive medicine.”
Defensive‐medicine discussions often focus on the contribution that malpractice pressure makes
to aggregate health care costs. In this regard, the concern is largely over so‐called “positive” defensive
medicine, in which physicians perform additional procedures and order extraneous tests in order to
reduce their potential malpractice exposure. However, malpractice forces need not operate in this
direction in all occasions. The threat of malpractice liability may also induce physicians to avoid
performing high‐risk procedures or accepting high‐risk patients, leading to a reduction in aggregate
expenditures. In the context of certain procedures, positive and negative forces may even offset each
other leaving no resulting impact on physician behavior.
In this paper, I explore the role that malpractice pressure plays in shaping certain obstetric
practices. Acknowledging that the threat of malpractice liability may have different effects on different
components of obstetric care, I estimate the relationship between malpractice pressure and each of the
following individual utilization measures: (1) episiotomy utilization during vaginal delivery, (2) hospital
lengths of stay during delivery admissions and (3) cesarean section utilization. Certain of these
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utilization measures are more likely than others to implicate positive‐defensive‐medicine concerns given
the nature of the medical circumstances in which they arise – e.g., the risks involved in their
implementation, the conditions they are intended to treat, etc.. For instance, while some risk is
involved in the performance of an episiotomy, such risks arguably pale in comparison to the more
general risks involved in the vaginal delivery itself. As such, malpractice fears may induce an
obstetrician to perform an otherwise‐unnecessary episiotomy during a vaginal delivery under the belief
that this action will alleviate potential liability from failing to properly deliver the child.
Consistent with much of the malpractice literature, I identify variations in prevailing malpractice
pressure using adoptions of various tort reforms, the effect of which is largely to reduce the probability
that malpractice suits are filed. While physicians are generally insured against losses in malpractice
cases (and typically are not experience‐rated), they may nonetheless be quite sensitive to the threat of a
potential malpractice suit in light of the significant reputational and non‐pecuniary costs that are
associated with malpractice liability (Currie and MacLeod 2008). The adoption of malpractice laws and
other tort reforms may operate to reduce the expected levels of damages imposed in the event that a
physician has been found liable. This reduction in expected liability may leave plaintiffs less inclined to
bring suit, thereby lessening the level of pressure placed on otherwise‐insured physicians. The reforms
that I emphasize in this analysis, and that have received the most attention by the malpractice literature
to date, are caps on non‐economic damage awards – i.e., caps on pain and suffering awards.
A large body of related literature has explored the relationship between tort reforms and
various outcomes of the malpractice marketplace: claims frequency, claims severity, insurance
premiums, and physician location.1 These studies suggest that non‐economic damage caps are perhaps
the most relevant and most influential tort reform measures (Mello 2006). Twenty‐eight states
currently have non‐economic damage cap provisions in place, most of which were adopted during the
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See Mello (2006) for an extensive review of this literature.
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malpractice crisis of the mid‐1980’s. Accordingly, those studies relying on post‐1980’s data to evaluate
the association between non‐economic damage caps and physician behavior (e.g., Currie and MacLeod
2008) fail to draw on the most relevant sources of variation in malpractice law. In this study, I explore
questions regarding defensive practices using data on physician behavior from the 1979‐2005 National
Hospital Discharge Surveys (NHDS). The NHDS data, supplemented with geographic identifier codes,
provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of states and covering a long enough
period of time to allow for a defensive medicine analysis that draws on an extensive set of legislative
variations.
Consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical circumstances, I find
evidence that malpractice pressure, as identified by adoptions of various tort reforms, is associated with
increased utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries and with the number of days spent in the
hospital in connection with the delivery of a child. At the same time, however, such pressure is not
associated with any improvements in neonatal outcomes, as proxied by infant Apgar scores, suggesting
(at least in the episiotomy case) that the malpractice‐induced changes in utilization may likely be
defensive in nature. On the other hand, confirming the findings of Currie and MacLeod (2008), I find no
evidence to support the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure induces obstetricians to
perform unnecessary cesarean sections.2
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related literature concerning
defensive physician practices. Section 3 offers a simple framework by which to evaluate a physician’s
response to malpractice pressure. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methodology, while
Section 5 presents results from the relevant regression analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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This investigation serves as a complement to a related study (Frakes 2009a), in which I explore the relationship
between regional variations in physician practices (primarily regarding cesarean utilization) and the geographical
component of laws respecting malpractice standards of care. Understanding the impact that these tort provisions
have on observed utilization measures should provide insight into the need to account for covariate malpractice
provisions in the convergence analysis considered in Frakes (2009a).
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Literature Review
While malpractice scholars and analysts are often inconsistent in their definition of “defensive

medicine,” the type of behavior that I hope to identify as being “defensive” in nature is that in which
malpractice liability causes physicians to take sub‐ or supra‐optimal levels of care, where optimality is
determined according to an appropriate weighing of the costs and benefits of care. This behavior is, of
course, inherently difficult to identify. In the alternative, I follow Kessler and McClellan (1996) and
related studies and classify observed behavior as being of a positive defensive nature when malpractice
pressure induces physicians to provide extra levels of care without leading to corresponding health
benefits. Negative defensive behavior, on the other hand, is identified by situations in which
malpractice pressure induces physicians to avoid otherwise beneficial care.
While most of the literature exploring the effects of malpractice / tort reforms has focused on
first‐stage litigation‐ and insurance‐related outcomes (e.g., claims frequency and malpractice
premiums), a smaller, yet significant, literature has explored the second‐stage effects of tort reform on
physician behavior. In perhaps the seminal study on the defensive nature of physician practices, Kessler
and McClellan (1996) found that malpractice reforms that directly reduce malpractice pressure (“direct”
reforms) are associated with a 5‐9% decrease in total hospital expenditures incurred for patients in the
1‐year period following an acute myocardial infarction or new ischemic heart disease, without
substantial reductions in mortality rates or complications. Direct reforms include caps on damages
awards (non‐economic, punitive, and total) and reforms of the collateral source rule.
Currie and MacLeod (2008) consider an empirical approach similar to that taken by Kessler and
McClellan (1996) but focus on the case of cesarean deliveries, a treatment that is often implicated in
popular discussions of defensive medicine and that is a common target of scholarly defensive medicine
investigations. Using data from the Vital Statistics Natality files from 1989‐2001, Currie and MacLeod
test the conventional wisdom that malpractice fears over improperly‐performed vaginal deliveries
5

induce obstetricians to perform excessive numbers of cesarean sections. Contrary to these
expectations, they actually find that the adoption of a non‐economic damage cap (representing a
reduction in malpractice pressure) leads to an increase in cesarean utilization.
Currie and MacLeod (2008) contend that this finding is consistent with a model of physician
behavior that provides for variations in patient conditions. Significant risks do occur during the
commission of a vaginal delivery, which would otherwise induce physicians to opt for cesarean delivery.
However, if the marginal patient receiving a cesarean delivery has a favorable case mix and is relatively
inappropriate for that delivery, then the risks to performing a cesarean section on this marginal patient
may outweigh the general risks of delivering her baby vaginally. Two recent studies (Frakes 2009b;
Baicker et al. 2006) have documented evidence of triage in regional cesarean utilization, where
physicians begin to perform cesareans on mothers with fewer and fewer indications for cesarean
delivery as cesarean rates increase within regions. In light of this evidence and considering the
possibility that financial incentives may operate to push regional cesarean rates to elevated levels, it
may be reasonable to assume that the marginal mother is inappropriate, in an absolute sense, for
cesarean delivery. Accordingly, it may be reasonable to assume that a physician treating this marginal
mother is sensitive to the risk of improperly performing a cesarean delivery and that malpractice
pressure thus pushes the cesarean rate downwards (not upwards) on the margin.
Consistent with the findings of Currie and MacLeod (2008), it follows then that the reduction in
malpractice risks associated with the adoption of a non‐economic damage cap may alleviate these
downward pressures and possibly lead to an increase in the equilibrium cesarean rate. This increase
may occur in a situation where these pre‐reform liability pressures had kept physicians from practicing
at an otherwise‐desired higher cesarean rate – e.g., in a situation where physicians now face fewer
liability constraints in their efforts to "induce" demand among their patients in response to prevailing

6

financial incentives.3 Avraham and Schanzenbach (2009) describe this possibility as one where tort
reform may increase the ability of physicians to practice "offensive medicine."
The findings of Currie and MacLeod stand in contrast to certain other studies that have explored
the relationship between malpractice pressure and cesarean utilization, though from different
methodological frameworks. For instance, using 1990‐1992 Natality data, Dubay et al. (1999) estimate a
county fixed‐effects specification and find a positive association between cesarean utilization and
malpractice insurance premiums. Finding no corresponding evidence of a positive association between
premiums and health outcomes (as indicated by the incidence of a low Apgar score), they conclude that
the observed behavior is defensive in nature. Similarly, using discharge data from acute care hospitals in
New York State in 1984, Localio et al. (1993) find a positive association between cesarean utilization
rates and malpractice premiums and claims frequency (controlling for patient severity and other
factors). Other studies, however, confirm the results of Currie and MacLeod to the extent that they
document no evidence of positive defensive medicine in cesarean utilization. Baldwin et al. (1995), for
instance, find no association between cesarean utilization and physicians’ claims exposure, as measured
by both personal physician claims experience and the prevailing practice environment (i.e., county
claims per physician).
Using variations in certain characteristics of the malpractice marketplace (e.g., claims frequency)
to identify defensive behavior, these additional studies implicate general concerns over unobserved
heterogeneity that may be correlated with both the outcome of interest and the relevant malpractice
characteristics. The approach taken by Currie and MacLeod (2008), however, draws on within‐state
variation of an arguably exogenous nature: the adoption of tort laws that are, for the most part,
applicable to torts generally and that were, in many instances, adopted in response to broader crises in
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Of course it is possible that the resulting cesarean rate will increase following reform where physicians otherwise
face fewer liability constraints to increase cesarean utilization for other, non‐financial reasons.
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commercial casualty insurance – i.e., not solely in response to more specific crises in medical
malpractice lines (Matsa 2006).
In the analysis below, I also identify defensive behavior using the adoption of various tort
reforms. However, I build on Currie and MacLeod (2008) by exploring physician behavior over a longer
time horizon, including the entirety of the 1980’s, a decade during which the heart of the non‐economic
damage‐cap adoptions occurred. By focusing on 1989‐2001 data, Currie and MacLeod only consider the
adoption of non‐economic damage caps by 4 states, 2 of which invalidated the relevant statute within
several years. They also consider variation in non‐economic damage caps for 4 other states whose
courts invalidated caps previously adopted in the pre‐1989 period. However, there may be good reason
to exclude from the specification those states that invalidate damage caps over the sample period.
Drawing on variations in the invalidate direction may lead to less precise estimates given the possibility
that physicians may respond weakly to a law that has a high probability of being stricken down (Matsa
2006). As discussed further below, the possibility of anticipated changes in physician behavior prior to
the invalidated damage caps may also limit the ability to perform important falsification exercises that
test for differential trends in utilization rates between treatment and control states in the pre‐reform
period. By limiting the specifications to exclude states that invalidated reforms, however, there are only
2 states from which to identify defensive behavior during the 1989 – 2001 period, implicating concerns
over the consistency of the estimated results (Conley and Taber 2005).
Drawing on data over this longer time frame, the analysis below includes nearly 20 states with
pure non‐economic damage cap adoptions (i.e., where such states did not also invalidate or repeal the
relevant statutes). With a greater number of treatment states, it is more likely that spurious state‐year
shocks that are uncorrelated with damage‐cap laws will average each other out, leaving consistent
estimates of the effect of such reforms (Conley and Taber 2005). Building on the above studies, I use
this rich set of legislative variation to test for evidence of defensive behavior in cesarean utilization.
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However, I also explore for defensive behavior in two related obstetric practices / measures: episiotomy
utilization and the number of days that mothers spend in the hospital in connection with the delivery of
their children.

3

Malpractice Pressure and Obstetric Practices
While defensive medicine discussions often focus on the role that malpractice pressure plays in

driving up total expenditures, malpractice fears are likely to impact physician behavior in a highly
context‐specific manner. In many situations, this fear may indeed be expected to induce physicians to
perform additional procedures and order extra tests. In other situations, however, this fear may result
in the avoidance of particular behaviors. To understand how liability can lead to such opposite results, it
helps to begin with a consideration of the context in which a medical procedure is performed.
In a given medical context, I treat malpractice liability fears as generally arising from two
fundamental directions: (1) fear over improperly treating (or diagnosing) an underlying disease or
medical condition and/or (2) fear over improperly performing a treatment meant to resolve or alleviate
that underlying disease or condition. These risks inherently find themselves in tension with other, in
that a physician risks exposing herself to liability from this first direction by capitulating to the fears
arising from the second direction. That is, if a physician avoids performing a particular high‐risk
treatment over fear of committing an error in the process, she exposes herself to potential liability from
failing to properly treat the condition/disease itself. Thus, the relationship between the underlying
level or extent of malpractice pressure and the utilization rate for the treatment in question will depend
on which of these two risks dominates under the circumstances.
This simple framework follows from Currie and MacLeod’s (2008) model of physician behavior in
the face of potential malpractice liability. A fundamental implication of their model is that (a) a
physician’s choice between performing a procedure and not performing a procedure depends upon the
relative malpractice (and other) risks of each such choice and (b) accordingly, a legal‐induced increase in
9

expected malpractice liability decreases procedure utilization if and only if the prevailing risks associated
with the procedure itself exceed those that prevail in the absence of its utilization. A key feature of their
model is that these calculations vary depending upon the condition or health status of the patients.
Consider a situation in which the marginal patient receiving the procedure (i.e., the patient just
indifferent between receiving and not receiving the treatment) is in relatively little need of the
procedure. The no‐procedure option for this patient may pose little risk relative to the risk of
improperly performing the treatment itself, leading to the possibility of negative defensive behavior.
Ultimately, the effect of a reduction in potential malpractice liability (e.g., that resulting from
tort reform) on the utilization of a given procedure is an empirical question that depends on the risks
ensuing from the execution of the procedure versus the risks relating to the failure to treat the
underlying condition, evaluated with respect to the marginal patient. With these considerations in
mind, I consider the effect of various tort reforms on the utilization rate of several procedures (or
medical decisions) that are likely to present different risk‐risk tradeoffs.
Episiotomy Utilization
An episiotomy is a surgical incision made in the tissue between the vagina and the perineum
during a vaginal delivery. Extremely common procedures, episiotomies were performed in nearly 40%
of the vaginal delivery sample considered below; though their rates have declined considerably over
time. While some of the traditional justifications for episiotomy utilization are no longer widely held
(e.g., the belief that controlled incisions heal better than natural tears), episiotomies are still indicated in
the event of certain complications of birth, such as abnormal presentation or fetal distress, or in
instances in which an expedited delivery is necessary.4
The circumstances surrounding episiotomy utilization are supportive of a possible positive
defensive response to malpractice pressure. Though there are some morbidity risks to the performance
4

For a recent discussion of the risks and benefits of episiotomy utilization, see Hartmann et al. (2005) and
American College of Obstetricians‐Gynecologists (2006).
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of an episiotomy, including an increased risk of fecal incontinence, the expected harm from such risks
arguably pale in comparison to the potential mortality and morbidity risks that are generally faced
during the vaginal delivery of a child. Moreover, even if the benefits of episiotomy are minimal in most
instances, as long as there is some legitimate belief that episiotomies are indicated in certain high‐risk
situations, this imbalance of risks may lead some risk‐adverse physicians to utilize episiotomies on a
relatively common basis. If anything, physicians may be inclined to perform arguably unnecessary
episiotomies for purely “optical” reasons – that is, to enhance the appearance that they took every step
possible to prevent harm to the mother and child. Moreover, for much of the sample period, many of
the risks associated with the performance of an episiotomy were not well documented5 and it was not
until 2006 when the American College of Obstetricians‐Gynecologists issued guidelines recommending
restricted, as opposed to routine, use of episiotomies.
Delivery Bed Days
During the course of an inpatient delivery admission, physicians are also faced with the decision
of how long the mother and child should stay in the hospital (aside from the separate but related
decision of whether to perform a cesarean section). An additional day in the hospital itself poses little
inherent risk to the mother and child (aside from the greater risk of a hospital‐acquired infection).
However, the additional monitoring provided by an extra inpatient day may alleviate general risks faced
during the neonatal period. The tradeoff in these risks suggests that physicians may respond in a
positive defensive manner to the threat of malpractice liability. Moreover, even if an additional bed day
does not significantly reduce neonatal risks, physicians may be inclined to keep certain high‐risk mothers
longer purely to bolster appearances in potential malpractice suits.
While cesarean‐adjusted length‐of‐stay measures may reflect express physician decisions
regarding neonatal monitoring durations, they may also, in part, proxy for various non‐cesarean
5

Beginning in the mid‐1980s and continuing to the present, a number of clinical trials have analyzed the risks of
routine versus restricted use of episiotomies (Hartmann et al. 2005).
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procedures or treatments performed in the neonatal period. To the extent that any such treatments
also pose few risks in their executions, relative to the general risks involved in delivering a child,
physicians may further respond in a positive defensive manner to the associated malpractice forces.
Cesarean Utilization
Considering the evidence of triage in cesarean utilization within regions found in Frakes (2009b)
and Baicker et al. (2006), and in light of the high cesarean rates prevailing in regions, it may be
reasonable to expect that the marginal cesarean delivery is not, in an absolute sense, truly in need of
cesarean delivery. Thus, with respect to the marginal cesarean patient, the risks posed by cesarean
delivery may actually be high enough relative to those posed by a standard vaginal delivery that
defensive cesarean behavior, though popularly expected, fails to hold in practice (Currie and MacLeod
2008).
Tort Reform Type
In the analysis presented below, I focus on estimating the impact of reforms that place caps on
the amount of non‐economic damages (i.e., damages for pain and suffering) that plaintiffs can be
awarded. Non‐economic damages represent a significant portion of the typical malpractice damages
award. Using a dataset of 326 closed claims in Texas for the 1988‐2004 period (each with at least a
$25,000 payout), Hyman et al. (2008) document an average non‐economic damages award of $681,000
(in 1988 dollars, compared with $542,000 for economic damages), occurring in 272 (or 83%) of the
closed claims included in the sample. Non‐economic damage caps represent the tort‐reform measure
that has been most commonly associated with an observed change in certain malpractice outcomes:
claims severity, physician supply and malpractice premiums.6 Twenty‐eight states currently have in
place laws that cap non‐economic damage awards.7 Seventeen states adopted such laws during the
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See Mello (2006) for a comprehensive review of relevant studies.
The vast majority of these states have laws that are specific to non‐economic damage awards. However, for the
purposes of this analysis, I also classify states as having non‐economic damages provisions if they have laws that
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mid‐1980’s (5 of which subsequently invalidated or repealed the relevant provisions). Table 1 lists those
states that modified their non‐economic damage cap laws over the sample period considered in the
empirical analysis below.
In most of the specifications estimated below, I also explore the association between physician
behavior and certain additional types of malpractice / tort reforms, including caps on punitive‐damages
awards, reforms of the collateral source rule and other “indirect” tort reforms. Punitive damages are
awarded on a much rarer basis in malpractice actions than are non‐economic damages awards (without
a correspondingly large increase in average awards / payouts).8 Thus, relative to non‐economic
damages, it is less likely that the threat of liability for punitive damages will have a considerable impact
on physician behavior.
Similar to caps on non‐economic and punitive damages, amendments to the traditional
collateral‐source rule represent malpractice reforms that operate to directly reduce the expected level
of damages awarded in malpractice actions (Kessler and McClellan 1996). Traditional collateral‐source
rules generally prohibited defendants from introducing evidence of compensatory payments made to
plaintiffs from outside sources (e.g., payments from insurance companies). Thirty‐three states currently
have laws in place that eliminate this traditional rule, effectively reducing the compensatory damage
awards that plaintiffs can obtain by amounts received from such outside sources. Many of these
amendments also occurred during the mid‐1980’s, often contemporaneously with the adoption of non‐
economic damage cap laws. Nonetheless, there are a substantial amount of independent reforms of

place caps on total damages awards, where such laws necessarily cap non‐economic damages as well. Considering
the imposition of state fixed effects, this decision has relevance only in the context of 1 state (Texas) that
experienced variation in the presence of a total damages cap at a time when it did not have a specific non‐
economic damage cap in place. Only 1 additional state (Colorado) experienced variation in the incidence of a total
damages cap over the sample period (2 years following the adoption of a non‐economic damages cap). With such
little within‐state variation in mind and considering the fundamental overlap between a total damages caps and a
non‐economic damages cap, I do not separately control for the incidence of a cap on total damages. However, the
estimation results for the remaining coefficients remain essentially unchanged when I do include this additional
covariate.
8
For evidence of this claim, see Cohen (2005) and Hyman et al. (2008).
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each type to allow for identification of the effect of these separate provisions. Table 2 lists those states
that adopted collateral source rule reforms over the sample period considered below.
Finally, following the classification of malpractice reforms introduced by Kessler and McClellan
(1996), I estimate the general impact associated with a set of reforms that more indirectly (relative to
damage caps and collateral‐source rule reforms) reduce the expected level of damages imposed in
malpractice actions. Included in this set of “indirect” reforms are contingency fee limitations,
requirements of periodic payment of future damages, joint and several liability reforms, and provisions
for a patients’ compensation fund. In their seminal study on defensive medicine, Kessler and McClellan
(1996) document a small positive effect of “indirect” reforms on malpractice intensity, as proxied by the
total expenditures associated with the care provided to a patient in the 1‐year period following the new
incidence of a serious heart condition.
Even though each of these malpractice reforms operates in some fashion to reduce expected
liability levels, each reform may have a unique impact on physician behavior depending on the precise
medical circumstances involved. For instance, where the harm caused by a particular type of medical
error is more likely to be associated with economic, as opposed to non‐economic, damages and where
the relevant harm can likely be treated by subsequent remedial treatments (which may be reimbursed
from third‐party insurers), a reform of the collateral source rule may be the provision more associated
with a change in physician behavior. On the other hand, where the potential damage caused by a given
course of action is of a more serious and irreversible nature, the effects of non‐economic damage caps
may be more significant in magnitude.

4

Data and Empirical Methodology
Data on the history of each state’s tort laws comes from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms

(2nd Draft), compiled by Ronen Avraham. Likewise, data on physician behavior is from the National
Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a nationally representative survey of inpatient records from short‐
14

stay, non‐federal hospitals conducted annually by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). I
supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers received pursuant to an agreement with
the Research Data Center at the NCHS and conduct all empirical work concerning the NHDS onsite at the
NCHS headquarters. The sample considered in this utilization analysis covers the years 1979 to 2005.9
Additional details on the NHDS are provided in Frakes (2009a). The defensive‐medicine analysis
presented below serves as a counterpart to the empirical investigation considered in Frakes (2009a),
which uses various tort provisions as covariates in an investigation into the relationship between
regional variations in cesarean utilization and the geographical components of malpractice standard‐of‐
care laws.
Using the diagnosis codes and other information provided in the NHDS records, I determine
whether an episiotomy or cesarean was performed in connection with each individual discharge, in
addition to determining the length of the stay associated with each discharge. I then evaluate these
utilization measures on the proper subsample of individual discharges, as follows:
(1) Cesarean Utilization and Number of Bed Days. To evaluate cesarean behavior and delivery
lengths of stay, I consider the subsample of all deliveries contained in the NHDS files,
determined using the appropriate diagnosis codes. This subsample is well protected against
sample selection concerns considering that virtually all deliveries occur in inpatient settings
– that is, the malpractice variables of interest should not impact the denominator used in
the utilization rate analysis.
(2) Episiotomy Utilization. To evaluate episiotomy utilization, I consider the subsample of
vaginal deliveries, which differs from the above subsample by excluding those deliveries
9

The convergence analysis presented in Frakes (2009a) also draws on data in the 1977‐1978 period. Data on
episiotomy utilization is only available beginning in 1979, however. Moreover, in most specifications estimated
below, I include controls for the case mix of the individual delivery. Most of the risk‐factors necessary to calculate
the complete case‐mix measure are also only available in the post‐1979 period. This more‐restricted time period
should not significantly impact the present analysis considering that the relevant legal variation generally does not
begin until the mid‐1980s.
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performed via cesarean section. This subsample, however, is more prone to sample
selection issues given that malpractice forces may impact the number of cesareans
performed in the relevant states and potentially impact the composition of the resulting
vaginal sample. I partially alleviate these concerns by including controls for the case mix of
the individual vaginal delivery, which I parameterize using the delivery’s predicted
probability of cesarean delivery, calculated according to Frakes (2009b).10
Descriptive statistics for the key utilization, legal and outcome variables discussed in the analysis
below are provided in Table 3. Episiotomies are performed on roughly 40% of the vaginal delivery
sample, while cesareans are performed on nearly 24% of the total delivery sample. The average mother
spends 2.8 days at the hospital during each delivery stay.
With respect to each of the above utilization measures, I first test for evidence of defensive
behavior by estimating the following basic difference‐in‐difference specification:
, ,

,

,

(1)

where s indexes state, t indexes year, and i indexes an individual discharge from the appropriate sub‐
sample; CAPs,t represents an indicator variable for the presence of a cap on non‐economic damages in
state s and year t; State fixed effects, γs, and year fixed effects, λt, control for fixed differences across
states and across years, respectively. In the episiotomy and cesarean specifications, Ui,s,t is an indicator
variable for the incidence of the relevant utilization measure. In the delivery length‐of‐stay
specification, Ui,s,t equals the log of the number of days that the mother spends in the hospital during
the delivery admission. The coefficient of interest in each specification is β1, representing the
relationship between the relevant utilization measure and the adoption of non‐economic damage caps.
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Sample selection are further mitigated in the episiotomy specifications by the fact that I document virtually no
relationship between the considered tort reforms and the rate at which physicians deliver via cesarean section (as
opposed to a vaginal delivery).
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I then test the robustness of the above findings to the inclusion of a range of individual and
state‐year factors by estimating the following specification
, ,

,

,

, ,

,

,

, ,

(2)

where Xi,s,t represents certain characteristics of the individual discharge: mother’s age (15‐19, 20‐24, 25‐
29, 30‐34, 35‐39 and 40+ years old); mother’s race (white, black and other); mother’s insurance status
(private, government, no insurance and other); hospital bed size (0‐100, 100‐200, 200‐300, 300‐500 and
500+ beds); and hospital ownership type (proprietary, non‐profit and government). Zs,t represents
certain state‐year characteristics (HMO penetration rate and its square, OB/GYN concentration rate,
fertility rate and median household income). Os,t is a matrix representing a set of indicator variables for
the incidence of the following tort / malpractice provisions: (a) collateral source rule reforms, (b) caps
on punitive damages, and (c) “indirect” tort provisions. I include state‐specific linear time trends, φs,t, to
control for slowly‐moving correlations between the relevant utilization rates in a state and the adoption
of tort reforms by that state.11
I also include controls in Xi,s,t to account for the case mix of the relevant delivery. I parameterize
the delivery case mix using the predicted probability of cesarean section (PPC) for the relevant delivery,
calculated according to Frakes (2009b). Each delivery’s PPC value is simply a single parameterization of
a much richer set of risk factors and delivery complications. The results are generally robust to the
inclusion of a set of individual indicator variables for each risk factor and to the exclusion of these risk‐
factor controls entirely. In the delivery bed‐days specification, I also include controls for the incidence of
cesarean delivery and episiotomy utilization (each of which generally lengthens a delivery stay) in order
11

I estimate the above models on the full NHDS sample. This approach contrasts with Frakes (2009a), which
focuses on the sample of states that maintain consistently large sample sizes in order to facilitate a well‐behaved
convergence analysis. For these reasons and in light of the fact that two of the damage‐cap treatment states used
in the defensive‐medicine analysis below (Hawaii and Texas) were dropped from the specifications estimated in
Frakes (2009a) (due to an inability to classify the full history of their standard‐of‐care laws), I exclude controls for
national‐standard laws in the specifications estimated below and focus instead on damage caps and related
provisions. However, the results presented below are robust to the inclusion of controls for national‐standard
laws and to the use of the restricted sample estimated in Frakes (2009a) (not shown).
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to target the investigation on the length‐of‐stay decision itself or at least to create a better proxy for any
other procedures (i.e., other than cesarean sections and episiotomies) performed during the mother's
stay.
A key identification concern in difference‐in‐difference models of the above nature is posed by
the possibility of underlying trends – for example, differential utilization trends between treatment and
control states that pre‐date the adoption of the tort reforms in question. The primary results presented
above partially account for this concern by including state‐specific linear time tends. As a falsification
test, I also check for the presence of underlying trends by modifying the above specifications to include
“leads” of the relevant tort variables – that is, indicator variables that switch from 0 to 1 in the year(s)
prior to the actual adoption of the reforms. Under the assumption that there are no such differential
trends that pre‐date the relevant reforms, the coefficients of the lead indicator variables should not
differ significantly from zero.
While most of the variation in damage cap laws throughout the sample derives from the initial
adoption of the relevant provision, a number of states also invalidated or repealed previously‐adopted
damage caps (8 states) throughout the sample. Following Matsa (2006), I also estimate specifications
that drop these adopt‐then‐invalidate states. This more‐restricted approach accounts for the possibility
that physicians will be less responsive to the relevant sources of malpractice pressure in those states
that face a high probability of dropping damage caps (which I identify by the actual act of
invalidation/repeal).12 Moreover, even in situations where these invalidated‐sources of variation are
more strongly associated with physician behavior, there may still be a concern that physicians anticipate
the upcoming change in law and alter their behavior ahead of time (understanding its likely retroactive
effect). Any such anticipation effects will confound the ability to perform the falsification exercises

12

In such states, physicians may indeed alter their behavior with this constitutional uncertainty in mind,
considering that any such repeal will likely have retroactive effect (Currie and MacLeod 2008).
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discussed above and accordingly test for differential trends in utilization rates between treatment and
control states that may otherwise be reflective of omitted factors.
Finally, to complete the defensive‐medicine analysis, I estimate the above specifications using 5‐
minute Apgar scores as the relevant dependent variable. Data on individual Apgar scores is from the
1978‐2004 Natality files, compiled as part of the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center
for Health Statistics. The Natality files provide demographic and health data for a 100% sample of all
births occurring in the post‐1985 period and either a 50% or a 100% sample, depending on the state, of
all births occurring in the pre‐1985 period. Included in the delivery‐related data available throughout
the entire sample are 5‐minute Apgar scores. Given immediately after birth, Apgar tests are designed to
assess the health of a newborn infant and to determine the need for resuscitative efforts. Scores are
given on a scale from 0 to 10 and assess a newborn’s activity, pulse, reflex irritation, appearance and
respiration. While Apgar scores arguably remain inappropriate as predictors of certain long‐term
outcomes, 5‐Minute scores nonetheless remain valid predictors of neonatal mortality (Casey et al.
2001).

5

Results
Tables 4 – 6 present the primary estimation results for this defensive medicine analysis,

demonstrating the relationship between various tort reform adoptions and (a) episiotomy utilization, (b)
delivery length‐of‐stay decisions, and (c) cesarean utilization, respectively. Table 7 likewise presents
estimation results for the effect of the relevant tort‐reforms on neonatal health outcomes. All
regression coefficients and standard errors presented in Tables 4 – 7 are multiplied by 100. Moreover,
standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within‐state correlations of the
error structure (Bertrand et al. 2004).
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5.1

Episiotomy Utilization
I begin with an exploration into whether malpractice pressure induces physicians to perform

additional episiotomies during vaginal deliveries, consistent with a positive defensive medicine story.
Specifically, I identify any such effect by determining whether the adoption of malpractice reforms that
reduce expected liability amounts (primarily, caps on non‐economic damages) lead to a reduction in
episiotomy utilization rates. Column 1 of Table 4 presents estimates of a basic difference‐in‐difference
(DD) specification that excludes the set of control variables and state‐specific linear time trends.
Consistent with the informal expectations indicated in Section 3 above, I find that the adoption of a law
capping non‐economic damage awards by a state is associated with a 4.6 percentage‐point reduction in
the episiotomy utilization rate of that state, representing an 11% reduction in the average state
episiotomy rate over the sample period.
In Columns 2 – 4 of Table 4, I demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results to the inclusion
of various control variables and state‐specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4), along with the
addition of lead dummy variables for the non‐economic damage cap laws (that switch 2 years prior to an
amendment in non‐economic damage cap provisions), which allow for a test of trends in episiotomy
rates that pre‐date the adoption of non‐economic damage caps (Columns 3 and 4). As demonstrated by
Column 2, the estimated relationship between non‐economic damage caps and episiotomy utilization
does not change substantially in magnitude with the addition of both state‐specific linear time trends
and a set of controls for various patient, hospital and state‐year factors (from a 4.6 percentage‐point
reduction to a 5.9 percentage‐point reduction). However, while the p‐value from the basic DD
specification is only 0.08, the estimated relationship does become statistically significant at the 5% level
with the inclusion of these additional factors.
A concern arises, however, from the pattern of results presented in the dynamic specifications
estimated in Columns 3 and 4. The coefficients of the 2‐year lead indicator variables are negative in
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both specifications and large enough in magnitude to suggest that the differential in episiotomy rates
between treatment and controls states may have materialized in the period prior to the adoption of
non‐economic damage cap laws. However, this finding may be due to the fact that a substantial portion
of the variation in non‐economic damage caps over the sample period arises from the invalidation or
repeal of previously‐adopted caps (affecting 8 states), most often as a result of a finding of
unconstitutionality by the relevant state’s highest court. Because a physician’s behavior in the pre‐
invalidation period may be judged according to the post‐invalidation law in such situations, physicians in
states that face a high probability of an unconstitutionality ruling may alter their behavior in anticipation
of such a ruling (Currie and MacLeod 2008; Matsa 2006).
In their investigation of cesarean practices, Currie and MacLeod (2008) find evidence consistent
with an anticipation story and estimate a statistically significant coefficient for the 12‐month lead
indicator for damage caps that turn “off” (at a magnitude close to that of the contemporaneous law
change coefficient); however, they estimate no such lead effect for damage caps that turn “on.” With
these concerns in mind, Matsa (2006) excludes those states that invalidated or repealed previously‐
adopted non‐economic damage caps in his investigation of the relationship between tort reforms and
physician location.
In Column 5 of Table 4, I follow the approach taken by Matsa (2006) and estimate a dynamic
specification with lead indicator variables that excludes those states that have invalidated or repealed
non‐economic damage caps at some point over the sample period. Focusing only on the initial adoption
of damage‐cap provisions, I continue to estimate a negative relationship between damage caps and
episiotomy utilization rates, though now at a slightly higher magnitude (‐8 percentage‐point reduction).
However, I now estimate a positive, statistically‐insignificant coefficient for the 2‐year lead indicator
(with a magnitude of 3), strengthening any argument of a causal connection between damage cap
adoptions and reduced episiotomy utilization.
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The results presented in Table 4 also suggest a negative relationship between episiotomy
utilization rates and the incidence of an “indirect” tort reform, though these estimates are statistically
insignificant in the general full‐state specifications and may have materialized in the pre‐adoption
period. While I find evidence that non‐economic damage cap adoptions lead to a reduction in
episiotomy utilization, I estimate an opposite‐signed coefficient (of similar, but smaller magnitude) for
the collateral source rule reform dummy; however, this estimate is not significantly different from 0 and
the lead coefficients likewise suggest that this positive relationship may simply be reflective of a pre‐
existing differential trend.

5.2

Delivery Length of Stay
In Table 5, I test for evidence of positive defensive behavior in a physician’s decision concerning

the number of days that a mother should spend at the hospital during her delivery stay. I again identify
any such effect by observing the physician response to tort reforms that reduce expected liability
amounts. In Column 1, I begin by estimating a simple DD specification, without controls or state‐specific
linear time trends, identifying the relationship between non‐economic damage‐cap adoptions and the
log of the number of bed days associated with the mother’s hospitalization. Consistent with an
expectation of positive defensive behavior in the length‐of‐stay decision, I find that the adoption of a
law capping non‐economic damage awards by a state is associated with an approximately 3.9%
reduction in the average maternal length of stay in that state (with a p‐value of 0.09).
In Columns 2 – 4 of Table 5, I again demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results to the
inclusion of various control variables (e.g., HMO penetration rates at the state‐year level) and state‐
specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4), along with the addition of lead dummy variables for the
non‐economic damage cap laws (Columns 3 and 4). As demonstrated by Column 2, the estimated
relationship between non‐economic damage caps and delivery bed days remains similar in magnitude
with the addition of both control variables and state‐specific linear time trends. However, as with the
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case of episiotomy utilization, the inclusion of these additional factors reduces the estimated standard
error of the damage cap coefficient and thereby reduces the associated p‐value (from a test of no
relationship) to 0.04.
I estimate negative coefficients for the two‐year lead indicator variables in each of the
specifications estimated in Columns 3 – 5 of Table 5, the last of which drops those states that invalidated
or repealed previously‐adopted damage caps over the sample period. However, the lead coefficients in
each instance are statistically‐insignificant and they are of relatively modest magnitude in the repeal
specification (Column 5), providing only weak evidence to suggest that the negative differential in
episiotomy rates between treatment and control states may have begun in the period prior to the
adoption of non‐economic damage cap laws. As in the case of episiotomy utilization, I estimate a
negative association between the duration of a mother’s hospital stay and the adoption of an “indirect”
tort reform, providing further evidence of a positive defensive response in a physician’s length‐of‐stay
decision to the threat of possible malpractice liability.
Also consistent with the findings of the episiotomy specifications, I estimate that a reform of the
collateral source rule is associated with an increase in the number of delivery bed days. Again, however,
this estimate is noisy in the full‐state specifications and may also be reflective of an underlying
differential trend between treatment and control states (Column 4). In any event, whether or not it is
reasonable to expect an opposite‐signed result between the damages‐cap coefficient and the collateral‐
source‐rule‐reform coefficient, it may be reasonable to expect that each such reform will be associated
with a different impact on the equilibrium length‐of‐stay measure, particularly considering the way in
which the type of damages implicated by this specific medical context (e.g., non‐economic vs. economic)
interacts with the type of liability risk associated with this medical decision (e.g., liability risk for
improperly treating a condition vs. liability risk for executing the procedure / medical decision itself).
For instance, under a traditional collateral source rule, the decision to keep a mother an extra day in the
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hospital may partially expose physicians to greater liability simply because that extra day itself may be
part of the economic damages they are expected to pay in the event that some other aspect of the care
leads to malpractice liability.13 A collateral‐source‐rule reform may eliminate the requirement to pay for
that cost if it is otherwise covered by a third‐party (a force which contributes to a positive relationship
between such reforms and the resulting length‐of‐stay measure). Considerations of this specific nature,
however, would not be a part of the non‐economic damages calculation.
The middle of the 1990s experienced of a wave of reforms mandating lengths of coverage for
hospital maternity visits, culminating with the passage of a federal law. To the extent that the
differential adoption of such reforms may have been related to a state's prevailing malpractice rules, a
concern arises regarding the consistency of the coefficients estimated in Table 5. To alleviate this
concern, I estimate specifications that simply exclude the 1995 to 1997 period from the sample (during
which all of the relevant rules were passed). The estimated pattern of coefficients remains essentially
unchanged under this restricted sample.

5.3

Cesarean Utilization
In Table 6, I test for evidence of defensive behavior in a physician’s decision to perform a

cesarean delivery. Table 6 follows the same structure as Tables 4 and 5 discussed above. In each
specification, I estimate small and statistically‐insignificant coefficients for each of the malpractice
provisions explored, including caps on non‐economic damages. These results generally provide no
evidence in support of the popular perception that malpractice pressures induce physicians to perform a
substantially greater number of cesarean deliveries. In the specification that includes both state‐specific
linear time trends and a set of control variables, as presented in Column 2, I find that the adoption of a
non‐economic damage cap is associated with a statistically‐insignificant 0.1 percentage point reduction

13

Of course, the decision to keep a mother an extra day may be associated with countervailing reductions in
expected economic damage awards in light of other risk considerations.
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in a state’s cesarean rate. Even assuming that the true effect is at the lower end of the estimated 95%
confidence interval for this coefficient, the adoption of a non‐economic damage cap would only be
associated with a ‐1.2 percentage‐point reduction in prevailing cesarean rates, representing a relatively
modest 5% reduction in the prevailing cesarean rate.
These estimates confirm the findings presented in Currie and MacLeod (2008) to the extent that
they too challenge the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure is responsible for much of the
excess in cesarean utilization. However, the estimates do suggest that if the relationship between non‐
economic damage caps and cesarean utilization is positive in nature (i.e., contrary to the conventional
wisdom), it is likely to be at a magnitude lower than that estimated by Currie and MacLeod, given that
their estimated damage cap coefficient of 1.2 is above the upper end of the 95% confidence interval for
the estimated damage‐cap coefficient indicated in Column 2 of Table 6.

5.4

Health Outcomes
The above results indicate that malpractice pressure may lead to certain increases in the

intensity of care provided by obstetricians in the delivery of children, including increased utilization rates
for episiotomies and increased delivery lengths of stay. It is of course possible that these positive
utilization forces do not meet the definition of “defensive” behavior put forth above, in that they are
actually associated with improvements in relevant health outcomes in the affected states. I explore this
possibility in Table 7, presenting estimates of the relationship between the adoption of non‐economic
damage caps (and related tort reforms) and the 5‐minute Apgar scores assigned to each newborn in a
sample of both cesarean and vaginal deliveries from the 1978‐2004 Natality Detail files. Given the
disconnect in the timing of this outcome measure (i.e., at delivery) and the delivery length‐of‐stay
measure (i.e., post delivery), this exercise is only useful in assessing the potential defensive nature of
delivery lengths of stay to the extent that this measure also proxies for other utilization decisions made
at or prior to delivery.
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In Column 1 of Table 7, I present estimation results for difference‐in‐difference specifications
that use the log of the 5‐minute Apgar score as the dependent variable (with full control variables and
state‐specific linear time trends). Column 2 analogously estimates specifications that use the incidence
of a “good” Apgar score (greater than or equal to 7) as the dependent variable. In each specification, I
estimate very small, statistically‐insignificant coefficients for the damage‐cap and collateral‐source rule
reform measures. For instance, while non‐economic damage cap adoptions are associated with a 10‐
20% reduction in the episiotomy utilization rate (4 ‐ 8 percentage‐point reduction) and a roughly 4%
reduction in the average delivery length of stay, I estimate that they are associated with a 0.01
percentage‐point increase in individual 5‐minute Apgar scores. Even assuming that the estimated effect
of damage‐cap adoptions is at the lower end of the relevant 95% confidence interval, the estimated
effect would still entail a minor 0.2 percentage‐point reduction in individual Apgar scores.
Consistent with a defensive‐medicine story, these findings suggest that the positive utilization
pressures created by malpractice fears do not generate corresponding improvements in health
outcomes to the affected patient population.14 If anything, the estimated positive coefficients
presented in Table 7 for the “indirect” malpractice reforms suggest that the documented reductions in
utilization rates stemming from “indirect” reform adoptions may be associated with improvements in
neonatal health, implying that malpractice pressures felt prior to these "indirect" reforms both
increased utilization rates and depressed neonatal health outcomes.

6

Conclusion
This paper contributes to an understanding of the manner in which malpractice pressure may

shape physician behavior. For the purposes of this investigation, I focus on certain decisions faced by
obstetricians during (and immediately) after the delivery of a child, a medical context that often

14

Moreover, the pattern of results presented in Table 7 remains largely unchanged when I drop those states that
repeal previously‐adopted damage cap laws over the sample period.
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implicates significant malpractice concerns. Consistent with much of the relevant literature, I use
adoptions of various malpractice / tort reforms to identify within‐state variations in malpractice
pressure. However, unlike the analysis undertaken recently by Currie and MacLeod (2008), which
addresses a substantially similar set of questions, I draw on a dataset of hospital discharge records that
allows for the identification of variation in physician behavior over the entire 1980’s, a time period
during which the most significant and relevant sources of legal variation occurred. The richness of the
legal variation provided by this longer sample period provides greater confidence in the consistency of
the estimated results. The results of this analysis confirm the findings of Currie and MacLeod to the
extent that I find evidence inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure
contributes significantly to the excessive cesarean utilization rates observed across regions.
Extending this analysis to other aspects of obstetric care, I find evidence consistent with positive
defensive behavior in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries and in the durations of
maternal lengths of stay. In each instance, I estimate that the adoption of a non‐economic damage cap
leads to a reduction in the relevant utilization measure without a corresponding change in observed
neonatal outcomes, implying that malpractice pressure may have previously induced over‐utilization of
these measures. These findings are intuitive considering that the imbalance of risks involved in the
relevant decision context may induce a risk‐averse physician to elect the arguably unnecessary
procedure (or additional bed day). In the cesarean context, however, the risks associated with the
procedure may be high enough and the medical circumstances of the marginal cesarean mother may be
minor enough that the balance of risks may not tip strongly in the direction of positive defensive
medicine.
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Table 1. Variations in Non‐Economic Damage Caps (1979‐2005)
State

Year Adopted

Alaska
Alabama
Colorado
Florida

1986
1987
1987
2004

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri

1987
1988
1995
1987
1987
1987
1987
1986
1986

Year Dropped
1992

1998

1990

State

Year Adopted

Mississippi
Montana
North Dakota
New Hampshire

2003
1996
1996
1987 (2)

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Texas
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia

2003 (2)
2004
1988
2004(2)
1988
1986
1986
1986

Year Dropped

1981 (1);
1991(2)
1992(1)
2000
1988(1)
1990

Years of adoption and invalidation/repeal (if applicable) of laws imposing caps on non‐economic damage awards in
malpractice cases (or tort cases generally) are indicated above. States are only included if their relevant
malpractice laws varied over the 1979 – 2005 period. Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it
represents a situation in which an adoption and invalidation/repeal occurred during the same year.

Table 2. Variations in Collateral‐Source Rule Reforms (1979‐2005)
State

Year Adopted

Year Dropped

State

Year Adopted

Alabama

1987 (1);
2001(2)
1987
1986
1988
1987
1990
1987

1997(1)

Montana

1988

North Dakota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Utah
Wisconsin
West Virginia

1988

Colorado
Connecticut
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota

1989
1987
1990
1987
1986

1991

1993
1995

Year Dropped

1981
1988
1985
2002(2)
2004
1988
2002(2)

1998(1)

1981(1)
2002

1987
1995
2003

Years of adoption and invalidation/repeal (if applicable) of laws reforming traditional collateral source rules are
indicated above. States are only included if their relevant malpractice laws varied over the 1979 – 2005 period.
Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it represents a situation in which an adoption and
invalidation/repeal occurred during the same year.
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Mean (Standard Deviation)

Panel A: Utilization Rates (NHDS)
Episiotomy (from sample of vaginal
deliveries)

41.1
(49.2)
2.8
(2.7)
23.4
(42.3)

Delivery Bed Days
Cesarean Section
Panel B: Outcome Measures (Natality
Data)

8.97
(0.86)
98.4
(12.7)

Apgar Scores (5‐Minute)
“Good” Apgar Score (>= 7)
Panel C: Tort Variables (in NHDS sample)

39.9
(49.0)
44.2
(49.7)
58.7
(49.2)
40.5
(49.1)
75.7
(42.9)
737,193
564,683
10,431,241

Non‐Economic Damage Caps
Non‐Economic Damage Caps: Adoption‐
Only States
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Punitive Damage Cap
“Indirect” Tort Reform
N (full delivery sample)
N (vaginal delivery sample)
N (Natality Data)

All statistics are multiplied by 100, with the exception of those presented for 5‐minute Apgar scores. Reported
statistics for Panels A and C are from an individual sample of deliveries from the 1979‐2005 National Hospital
Discharge Survey records. Episiotomy utilization rates are presented from the subsample of vaginal deliveries.
Statistics for the tort variables are presented out of the full delivery sample in the NHDS records. The statistics for
the tort variables are nearly identical (not shown) using the subsample of vaginal deliveries. Statistics reported in
Panel B are from a 10% random sample of the 1978‐2004 Natality Detail files.

31

Table 4. Episiotomy Utilization: Difference‐in‐Difference Estimates (among
Sample of Vaginal Deliveries)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

‐4.61*
(2.60)

‐5.90**
(2.37)

‐

‐

‐3.75
(2.38)
‐1.32
(1.11)

‐3.15
(1.96)
‐3.49**
(1.74)

‐8.01**
(3.61)
2.96
(2.17)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

3.08
(3.02)

‐

4.60
(3.61)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

2.37
(2.94)
2.01
(1.73)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

0.37
(2.50)

‐

0.16
(2.51)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

‐0.88
(1.94)
2.54
(2.38)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

‐2.45
(3.49)

‐

‐8.28***
(3.06)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

‐2.63
(2.62)
‐1.74
(2.28)

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO
NO
564,683

YES
YES
430,960

NO
NO
564,683

YES
YES
430,960

YES
YES
355,091

Non‐Economic Damage Cap:
Contemporaneous Dummy
2‐Year Lead Dummy
Collateral Source Rule Reform

‐

Punitive Damage Cap

‐

“Indirect” Tort Law

Exclude States that Invalidate
Damage Caps?
Control Variables?
State‐Specific Linear Trends?
N

‐

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100.
Robust standard errors corrected for within‐state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported
coefficients are from difference‐in‐difference regressions, using a sample of vaginal deliveries, of the incidence of episiotomy
utilization on the adoption of non‐economic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include
additional state‐year tort provisions along with state‐specific linear time trends and other state‐year controls. Columns 3 – 5
also include two‐year lead indicator variables for the damage‐cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two years prior
to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by
invalidating or repealing a previously‐enacted damage cap provision. Data on episiotomy utilization is from the 1979‐2005
National Hospital Discharge Survey records.

Table 5. Delivery Bed Days: Difference‐in‐Difference Estimates (among Sample of
all Deliveries)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

‐3.86*
(2.28)

‐3.61**
(1.74)

‐

‐

‐3.14
(2.32)
‐1.12
(1.36)

‐2.79**
(1.31)
‐1.47
(1.13)

‐4.57
(2.74)
‐0.71
(1.69)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

2.85
(1.76)

‐

4.72**
(1.81)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

2.09
(1.44)
1.46
(1.00)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

2.07
(1.42)

‐

0.03
(2.14)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

2.73
(1.98)
‐1.32
(2.54)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

‐3.42*
(1.73)

‐

‐4.99**
(2.44)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

‐4.10**
(1.60)
1.16
(1.03)

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO
NO
737,193

YES
YES
565,201

NO
NO
737,193

YES
YES
565,201

YES
YES
465,153

Non‐Economic Damage Cap:
Contemporaneous Dummy
2‐Year Lead Dummy
Collateral Source Rule Reform

‐

Punitive Damage Cap

‐

“Indirect” Tort Law

Exclude States that Invalidate
Damage Caps?
Control Variables?
State‐Specific Linear Trends?
N

‐

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100.
Robust standard errors corrected for within‐state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported
coefficients are from difference‐in‐difference regressions, using a sample of vaginal and cesarean deliveries, of the number of
bed days associated with an individual delivery stay (logged) on the adoption of non‐economic damage cap laws. The
specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include additional state‐year tort provisions along with state‐specific linear
time trends and other state‐year controls. Columns 3 – 5 also include two‐year lead indicator variables for the damage‐cap
adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state
that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by invalidating or repealing a previously‐enacted damage cap provision.
Data on delivery lengths of stay is from the 1979‐2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.

Table 6. Cesarean Section Utilization: Difference‐in‐Difference Estimates (among
Sample of all Deliveries)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.07
(0.63)

‐0.10
(0.57)

‐

‐

0.13
(0.55)
‐0.09
(0.50)

0.25
(0.53)
‐0.47
(0.35)

0.47
(1.09)
0.31
(0.62)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

0.36
(0.58)

‐

0.43
(0.69)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

0.49
(0.44)
‐0.30
(0.49)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

‐0.33
(0.44)

‐

‐0.71
(0.70)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

‐0.33
(0.45)
‐0.01
(0.46)

Contemporaneous Dummy

‐

0.00
(0.67)

‐

‐0.73
(1.09)

2‐Year Lead Dummy

‐

‐

‐

‐0.09
(0.62)
0.06
(0.46)

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO
NO
737,193

YES
YES
565,201

NO
NO
737,193

YES
YES
565,201

YES
YES
465,153

Non‐Economic Damage Cap:
Contemporaneous Dummy
2‐Year Lead Dummy
Collateral Source Rule Reform

‐

Punitive Damage Cap

‐

“Indirect” Tort Law

Exclude States that Invalidate
Damage Caps?
Control Variables?
State‐Specific Linear Trends?
N

‐

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100.
Robust standard errors corrected for within‐state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported
coefficients are from difference‐in‐difference regressions, using a sample of all deliveries, of the incidence of cesarean section
utilization on the adoption of non‐economic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include
additional state‐year tort provisions along with state‐specific linear time trends and other state‐year controls. Columns 3 – 5
also include two‐year lead indicator variables for the damage‐cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two years prior
to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by
invalidating or repealing a previously‐enacted damage cap provision. Data on cesarean utilization is from the 1979‐2005
National Hospital Discharge Survey records.

Table 7. 5‐Minute Apgar Scores: Difference‐in‐Difference Estimates (among
Sample of all Deliveries)

Non‐Economic Damage Cap Dummy
Collateral Source Rule Reform Dummy
Punitive Damage Cap Dummy
"Indirect" Tort Law Dummy
Sample
Control Variables and State‐Specific Trends?
N

(1)

(2)

LOG(APGAR SCORE LEVEL)
0.01
(0.09)
0.12
(0.09)
‐0.10
(0.12)
0.10
(0.08)
ALL STATES
YES
7,450,600

"GOOD" APGAR SCORE (0/1)
‐0.00
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
‐0.05
0.03
0.11**
(0.03)
ALL STATES
YES
7,450,600

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within‐state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference‐in‐difference regressions,
using a sample of cesarean and vaginal deliveries, of the log of each individual Apgar score associated with the delivery (Column
1), or the individual incidence of a “good” Apgar score (Column 2), on the adoption of non‐economic damage cap laws and
other tort provisions. Apgar scores of 0 are set to 0.1 prior to the log transformation in Columns 1 and 2. Each specification
also includes a set of individual demographic and other state‐year controls, in addition to state‐specific linear time trends. Data
on neonatal outcomes is from a 10% sample of all deliveries in the 1978‐2004 Natality Detail files.

